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Rethinking Banal Nationalism: Banal Americanism, Europeanism,  
and the Missing Link between Media Representations and Identities 
 
VERA SLAVTCHEVA-PETKOVA1 
University of Chester, UK 
 
This article questions some tacit assumptions underpinning Michael Billig’s banal 
nationalism concept but also confirms the ongoing relevance of aspects of his central 
argument. It demonstrates that the taken-for-granted link between banal flaggings of 
nationalism in the media and national identities is highly problematic. Drawing on a 
content analysis of seven TV news and current affairs programs and an audience study 
with 174 children in Bulgaria and the United Kingdom as well as Eurobarometer survey 
data on adults, this article explores two “derivatives” of banal nationalism: banal 
Europeanism and banal Americanism. It demonstrates that banal nationalism does not 
entirely work as Billig anticipated in contexts outside the respective country’s national 
borders, especially regarding examples of deixis in the media coverage or embedded 
identities.  
 
 “Having written Banal Nationalism, I hoped that others would then analyze in detail the banality 
of the world’s most powerful nationalism―that of the United States. Instead, it has been the less powerful 
nationalisms that have attracted attention” (Billig, 2009, p. 351). Michael Billig’s banal nationalism 
concept has been widely used in nationalism and media studies. At the core of his thesis lies the argument 
that politicians and the mass media “flag” nationhood daily in the eyes of the citizens of established 
Western democracies. This study contributes to this growing body of research by following the advice Billig 
(2009) gave when reviewing the concept, namely, to investigate the banality of the world’s most powerful 
nationalism. Originally, my research was oriented toward banal Europeanism (Cram, 2001, 2009) in two 
European countries: the United Kingdom (UK) and Bulgaria. In 2009, when Billig was reviewing his 
concept, Cram (2009) was again claiming that there was a EU-focused banal Europeanism, though her 
argument and empirical evidence seemed different from those in her first work. In 2001, Cram had built 
fairly closely on Billig’s argument, and hence concentrated on the media’s role, but in 2009 the media 
escaped mention; instead, the focus was on “the concept of European Union identity” (p. 109). Inspired 
by both Billig’s and Cram’s claims, I started looking for trends of banal Europeanism in two very different 
national contexts: the Eastern European EU newcomer Bulgaria and the UK, an old but notoriously 
Euroskeptical EU member state in Western Europe. Instead of finding banal Europeanism in the UK, 
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however, I found a derivative of banal nationalism that I had not explicitly sought, but that Billig (2009) 
urges researchers to explore—“that of the United States” (p. 351), which I label “banal Americanism.” 
 
 While affirming some aspects of Billig’s concept, such as the importance of symbols, the article 
also questions several of his tacit assumptions and demonstrates the need for further elaboration, 
especially in relation to the taken-for-granted link between banal flaggings and allegedly banal identities. 
My findings suggest that Billig’s concept cannot fully explain whether and how banal nationalism operates 
at levels beyond the national, especially in terms of the spread of Europeanism in Europe and 
Americanism in non-U.S. contexts. Cram’s attempts to conceptualize banal Europeanism offer an even 
weaker explanation. This study makes an initial attempt to conceptually elaborate on the differences in 
which banal nationalism and its derivatives operate within and outside national borders. It explores three 
key factors: the problematic assumption that a “homogenous national audience” (Skey, 2009, p. 335) 
exists, the missing link between banal media representations and identities, and the need to differentiate 
between the importance of symbols and deixis. 
 
From Banal Nationalism to Banal Europeanism and Americanism? 
 
 At the heart of Billig’s (1995) concept is the view that there is a “continual ‘flagging,’ or 
reminding, of nationhood through the daily reproduction of ‘ideological habits’” (pp. 6–8). “The national 
flag hanging outside a public building in the United States attracts no special attention. . . . Daily the 
nation is indicated, or ‘flagged,’ in the lives of its citizenry” (Billig, 1995, p. 6). Two particular aspects of 
Billig’s ideas are pertinent. First, nationhood is flagged by politicians and through the mass media:  
 
In routine practices and everyday discourses, especially those in the mass media, the 
idea of nationhood is regularly flagged. Even the daily weather forecast can do this. 
Through such flagging, established nations are reproduced as nations, with their 
citizenry being unmindfully reminded of their national identity. (Billig, 1995, p. 154)  
 
Billig (1995) convincingly demonstrated in his “Day Survey” of British newspapers how the 
flagging takes place through the use of symbols (such as the national flag) and deixis, defined as “little 
words”—we, our, this, here, the nation—that are “continually pointing to the national homeland as the 
home of the readers” (p. 11). This study will show the extent to which Europeanism is flagged in the 
media, first by indicating the share of stories with European reference and then by investigating what 
kinds of symbols and people dominate these stories; it will also record examples of deixis. Academics who 
have conducted studies in Scotland (e.g., Law, 2001; Petersoo, 2007; Rosie, Petersoo, MacInnes, Condor, 
& Kennedy, 2006), however, question some aspects of Billig’s theory in “stateless nations,” especially the 
use of deixis as an indicator of banal nationalism. “In newspaper articles will pronouns like ‘we’ reinforce 
the idea of ‘we the British’ or ‘we the Scots’? And if there is that ambiguity, how can it be said that these 
pronouns are powerful drivers of banal British nationalism?” (Crawford, 2011, p. 5). An important 
contribution this article makes, therefore, is not only to look for examples of both symbols and deixis but 
also to investigate whether banal media representations transfer into banal identities among a specific 
audience and are indeed the means through which European identity is “being renewed continually” (Billig, 
1995, p. 127).  
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Identity will be studied within a sociological frame. Although most studies on European identity 
adopt a social psychological understanding built on Tajfel (1981) and Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and 
Wetherell’s (1987) social identity and self-categorization theories, scholars have recently called for more 
sociological input because of the alleged marginalization of the role of society in EU research. Hence, this 
study will adopt a sociological understanding of identity as an ongoing process (Jenkins, 2004), which 
implies a “series of identifications” (Woodward, 2002, p. 17). Apart from self-categorization, it involves 
social categorization—society labeling a collectivity (Jenkins, 2004). The sociological approach allows 
investigation of both children’s self-identifications and society’s role (limited to the role of the media) 
rather than a concentration on individual perceptions alone. As Sanchez (2006) argued, identity is 
“ultimately grounded in social reality” (p. 33). Billig (1995) himself criticized both psychological and 
sociological approaches and seemed to embrace a social psychological one involving the study of 
discourse. He did not, however, conduct such a study. He also assumed that media continually renew 
national identity but did not probe that assumption through an audience study. Such probing is vital, 
however, because as some of Billig’s critics (Rosie et al., 2006; Skey, 2009) have pointed out, it is 
problematic to assume that there is “a uniform, homogenous national audience” (Skey, 2009, p. 335). 
 
Banal Europeanism: Trends and Issues 
 
 Like Billig, Cram (2009) supported her claim that a “degree of banal Europeanism already exists 
within the EU” (Cram, 2001, p. 352) by making several assumptions about the ways in which European 
integration has influenced identities. First, Cram (2001) argued that news coverage of EU politicians and 
events had become “home” (p. 353). Unlike Billig, however, she did not back her claim with empirical 
evidence. Cram (2001) also assumed that people no longer noticed the EU flag flying alongside their 
national flags on buildings or depicted on their EU driving licenses and passports, though she admitted 
that “considerable empirical data is required” (p. 357). Later, she (Cram, 2009) seemed to accept the 
banality of Europeanism as a given, though she took a different approach to studying it by looking at how 
the EU has influenced identities in different contexts and claiming that “European integration facilitates the 
flourishing of diverse national identities,” which therefore “encourages the enhabitation of the EU at an 
everyday level and the reinforcement of a sense of banal Europeanism which is a crucial aspect of the 
European integration process” (p. 109). This conclusion is based on a few case studies that examined the 
impact of European integration on national identities. The evidence is hardly enough to prove a point for 
banal Europeanism even in these contexts, let alone generally. I use the term derivative to refer to banal 
Europeanism because Cram built her notion very closely on Billig’s concept. She not only quoted his work 
extensively but also attempted to base her own research on his concept’s main tenets. The extent to 
which she has succeeded in that respect is highly arguable, especially in her latest research, where she 
and colleagues (Cram, Patrikios, & Mitchell, 2011) conducted experiments and looked for “cues”—which 
arguably went against the grain of Billig’s understanding. This study will show whether there is an 
“enhabited” sense of banal Europeanism, and it will also reveal the extent to which Billig’s concept can be 
used to explain its alleged derivatives. 
 
 In Billig’s case, the lack of an empirical study on the degree of proliferation of national identity 
can be excused by the almost commonsensical expectation that we do indeed live in a world of nations 
and people associate with them, this is hardly an excuse when claims about banal Europeanism are made. 
46 Vera Slavtcheva-Petkova International Journal of Communication 8(2014) 
 
To start with, there is no academic consensus on whether there is a sense of or “such a thing as a 
European identity” (Bruter, 2005, p. xii). Some scholars (Bruter, 2005) firmly believe that there is, while 
others (Breakwell, 1996) are skeptical. Second, recent EU developments such as the Eurozone crisis and 
the failed EU Constitutional Treaty referenda show that “the legitimacy problem is real and the lack of a 
common collective identity is part of the problem” (Sigalas, 2010, p. 244). Although it might sound 
counterintuitive to study European identity while the EU is in crisis, Díez Medrano (2008) has argued that 
“now” is the time to do so because the EU covers “a whole range” of policy areas and “has a tremendous 
impact on the European citizens’ lives” (p. 4). As Bache and George (2006) claim, the development of a 
common European identity might provide a solution to the democratic legitimacy problem and thereby 
facilitate the functioning of the EU and its future prospects. If European identity is a means to an end, 
then it is certainly worth researching the topic. It is also important to ask whether the alleged influence of 
the media is as strong as claimed. Is the mass media indeed an important agenda-setter in relation to 
Europeanization? Some academics (a summary in Triandafyllidou, Wodak, & Krzyzanowski, 2009) even 
speculate on the existence of a European public sphere; however, most evidence suggests that “the 
European public sphere does not exist” (Habermas, 2006). 
 
Toward Banal Americanism: Cultural Proximity or Universal Spread? 
 
Two caveats are due. First, this study will indeed compare the level of manifestation of banal 
Europeanism in the media with the degree of proliferation of European identity among a specific age 
group. But as Lang and Lang (2006) claim, it is important to show not only what the media focus on but 
also what is missing because the missing topics, people and issues “have consequences, short-term and 
long-range” (p. 171). Even if we can claim some degree of correlation between media coverage and 
audiences’ knowledge and identities, the “media/identity relationship” is “not a causal one” (Madianou, 
2005, p. 5). TV is likely to be only one identity-building resource among other socialization agents such as 
school and parents as well as social structures like class and ethnicity (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2013; 
Slavtcheva-Petkova,& Mihelj, 2013). Moreover, collective identities are multiple, flexible, and constantly in 
flux. To better understand the role of the media, this study follows Schlesinger’s (1991) advice  
 
not to start with communication and its supposed effects on collective identity and 
culture, but rather to begin by posing the problem of collective identity itself, to ask how 
it might be analyzed and what importance communication practices might play in its 
constitution. (p. 151)  
 
Second, although banal Europeanism and Americanism are both described as derivatives of banal 
nationalism, they are different concepts. Banal Europeanism refers to a supranational identity where 
belonging and identification are linked to being part of Europe as a continent and/or a civilization and/or 
the European Union as an organization. Banal Americanism, on the other hand, is related to the 
widespread process of Americanization, which Billig (1995) largely equates with globalization. He claims 
there is a “global transmission of American culture” and “the global, transnational culture is predominantly 
American” but admits that “there has been no detailed study of the quantity and quality of the ways” (pp. 
149–150) in which American symbols are flagged globally. His work almost suggests that these flaggings 
of Americanism are universal across the globe. My findings will challenge this assumption by pointing out 
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the huge importance of the different relationships the United States and Bulgaria have with Britain. While 
trends of Americanization are widespread, the UK is not simply one of the numerous countries influenced. 
It prides itself on having a “special relationship” with the United States and is also in “cultural proximity” 
(Straubhaar, 1991) to America. Bulgaria, on the other hand, a former communist country, was “in a 
special relationship” with Russia for decades and is in “cultural proximity” to Slavic nations as well as 
some of its neighbors. 
 
A Missing Link Between Banal Media Representations and Banal Identities? 
 
 The review of the concepts of banal nationalism and Europeanism suggests that at least three 
aspects need further elaboration—a contribution this article will make. First, Billig (1995) did not 
empirically explore the relationship between banal manifestations in the media and identities. His 
underlying assumption was that national identity “is continually being flagged” in the media and is 
therefore accepted as “an identity of identities” (pp. 92–93). Nonetheless, Billig (1995) took this 
assumption for granted: he confirmed the proliferation of banal representations of nationalism in the 
media through his Day Survey, but he did not empirically confirm the strength, nature, and proliferation of 
national identity. His critics have some ground in claiming that “the very notion of a uniform, homogenous 
national audience” (Skey, 2009, p. 335) is problematic. It is problematic to assume that all people in a 
nation will unequivocally embrace national identity, especially in the form in which it is banally flagged. 
Rosie et al. (2006) showed that this is particularly true in the case of the UK, a nation-state of four 
nations, by demonstrating that in Scotland it is not always clear which banal identity is flagged: the 
Scottish or the British.  
 
 Second, assuming a link between banal representations and banal identities is even more 
problematic beyond the national level. Do banal representations of Europe transfer into European 
identities? Even if U.S. nationalism is the most powerful nationalism and has proliferated outside the 
United States, does it transfer into national identities outside the United States? Put simply, do English or 
Bulgarian citizens feel American because they are so used to the banal flaggings of Americanism in their 
national media that they no longer notice the U.S. flag or the U.S. president on TV? Far from it. How does 
the banality of Americanism in the media, then, influence people’s identities in non-U.S. national contexts? 
This is hardly an issue explored by Billig, who alluded to the global spread of American culture but did not 
make claims about, for instance, the way American “icons” address foreign audiences as “we.” Yet it is an 
important question. Third, this study offers a partial explanation of this apparent lack of a straightforward 
link between banal flaggings and identities. Billig described the importance of symbols and deixis in the 
flagging of nationalism, but he did not actually investigate the interplay between symbols and deixis, or 
look closely at the link between symbols, deixis, and their impact on specific audiences. The study 
addresses this issue because deconstructing the essential components of banal nationalism is key to 
understanding the application and relevance of the concept. Unfortunately, many scholars build their 
arguments on examples of either symbols or deixis and rarely aim to draw a fuller, though perhaps more 
disjointed, picture. Finally, even if Cram’s argument holds, the question remains as to how banal 
Europeanism operates. Cram’s approach differed significantly from Billig’s, incorporating speculations 
about the media’s role (2001), examples of flourishing marginalized identities (2009), and an 
experimental study (Cram et al., 2011) that investigated whether EU-related cues raise levels of European 
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identification. What Billig and Cram have in common, however, is that they both take for granted the link 
between identity and banal nationalism/Europeanism, an assumption probed in this study. 
 
Why Children? 
 
 Media scholars have traditionally been interested in children, and whereas academics (most 
notably Barrett, 2007) have researched young people’s national and collective identities, albeit not in 
relation to media’s influence, there is a dearth of studies on the applicability of banal nationalism among 
children. Phillips (1998) speculated that banal nationalism influences young people in the same way as it 
does adults, but he did not back up his assumptions with findings. Billig (1995) himself suggested that 
children are indeed equal participants in the process. In fact, one of his most memorable examples is of 
U.S. children pledging alliance to the U.S. flag: 
 
Children, in knowing that this is the way in which school starts, will take it for granted 
that other pupils, the length and breadth of the homeland, are also beginning their day 
similarly; and that their parents and grandparents, if schooled in the United States, did 
likewise; they might even suppose that all over the world the school day starts thus. 
This does not mean that an awareness of national unity bubbles excitedly within the 
mind of each pupil on each and every school day. But it does mean that the nation 
celebrates itself routinely. (p. 51) 
 
 Not only did Billig (1995) allude to the fact that children are influenced by the manifestations of 
banal nationalism; he also argued that it has hardly attracted as much scholarly attention as it deserves. 
This study, therefore, makes an important contribution to the field of nationalism-related media studies by 
“testing” the applicability of banal nationalism among children. Moreover, the choice of this specific age 
group—ages 9 and 10—is not accidental. Media scholars maintain that children are active, capable media 
users (e.g., Buckingham, 2003) and that at these ages they reach a peak in TV viewing (Paik, 2001). 
Identity scholars (e.g., Barrett, 2007; Jenkins, 2004) also show that pupils actively take part in the 
process of collective identities and by age 9 not only define themselves through a national identity but 
also attribute considerable significance to it. Subsequently, by 10 they might endorse a supranational 
identity such as the European one.  
 
 This article’s focus is on children as a group that, though under-researched in the context of 
media and national and European identities, is nonetheless flagged up by Billig. However, it also offers a 
brief comparison with the trends among adults as evidenced by Eurobarometer surveys. European identity 
scholarship has made wide use of Eurobarometer surveys, but here the data are mainly utilized for 
illustrative purposes because of limitations in the formulation of the identity questions. The aim is partially 
to reveal whether age is a factor that influences the extent to which banal media representations are 
linked to banal identities.  
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Why Bulgaria and England? 
 
 Three main reasons guided the choice of a most different systems design (MDSD) in which 
different rather than similar countries are compared. First, Bulgaria and the UK are both part of the EU—a 
unique international organization whose 28 member states have different historical, cultural, political, and 
economic trajectories in relation to Europe and the EU. By comparing two different countries, a fuller 
picture can be drawn of the potential factors involved in the European identity process. Billig (1995) 
claims that the continual flagging of nationhood takes place in “established nations,” namely “those states 
that have confidence in their own continuity” or what is referred to as “the West” (p. 8). He adds that to 
demonstrate the role of the media “systematically, it would be necessary to sample the various forms of 
mass media and mass culture over a lengthy period of time in a number of countries” (p. 109). And 
indeed, banal nationalism has been explored in various contexts, from Turkey (Yumul & Özkirimli, 2000) 
to Argentina (Benwell & Dodds, 2011). Second, Przeworski and Teune (1970), the authors of the MDSD, 
argue it is more suitable than the most similar systems design (MSSD) when the researcher is studying 
levels lower than systems, such as individuals, groups, and communities, which is exactly what this study 
does. In Livingstone’s (2003) view, analyzing similar countries makes sense only when the nation is the 
object of study. The final reason is the researcher’s insider knowledge—key in qualitative research. 
Although it would have been much better to conduct audience studies in all four nations of the UK, this 
was not feasible. Hence, the audience study focused on England, the biggest and most Euroskeptical of 
the four, despite the high likelihood that the findings would differ in the other three nations, given the 
different dynamics between national identities. Here, therefore, English will refer to the audience study, 
but because the TV content analysis is based on programs aired in all four nations, British is used when 
reporting media coverage trends. 
 
Methods 
 
 The study consists of two key components: a content analysis of seven TV programs—four British 
and three Bulgarian—and an audience study comprising 174 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with 
children in 10 schools in Bulgaria and England. Secondary data from Eurobarometer’s 2010 standard 
survey are used for illustration and comparison purposes.   
 
Media Content Analysis 
 
 Sampling. A pilot study with 50 children was conducted prior to the media content analysis to 
determine the media sample on the basis of children’s actual viewing patterns and reported sources of 
information on Europe and the EU. The pilot showed that TV was the main source of news for children and 
the most important source on Europe and the EU among all mass media, which is why the sample 
consisted only of the TV news programs children watched most. The findings from the entire study later 
largely confirmed the results from the pilot study. Children were asked a lot of media-use questions, 
especially about their sources of information on Europe and the EU, and patterns of parental and school 
mediation. They were also asked to discuss specific TV programs and to recall where, when, and in what 
contexts they had seen certain people or symbols. Therefore, this audience study is based on an 
investigation of the actual programs these children reported watching. In Bulgaria, the programs were two 
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news editions (bTV Novinite and Calendar) and a breakfast show (Zdravey, Bulgaria), aired by the two 
biggest private TV channels―bTV and Nova TV.  In England there were four programs: three news 
broadcasts (BBC1 News, ITV1 News and the children’s news program Newsround) and a children’s 
magazine (Blue Peter) aired by the noncommercial public service broadcaster BBC and the commercial 
public channel ITV.  
 
The sample was collected through a constructed week sampling on the following days: November 
18, 2009; December 10, 2009; December 18, 2009; January 12, 2010; January 18, 2010; January 30, 
2010; and February 7, 2010.  The aim was to catch a snapshot of typical coverage in a fairly average, 
non-event period. Non-event means free of Europe/EU-related major events that could have triggered 
more European coverage than usual. Another aim was to collect the sample as close as possible to the 
dates of the interviews to better link the trends children reported with the trends observed in studying the 
actual TV programs they watched. 
 
Measures. Media representations of the EU and Europe were researched through content analysis, 
using key quantitative techniques as outlined by Berelson (1971) and Krippendorff (1981/2004) and 
drawing on research studies on EU topics (e.g., De Vreese et al., 2006) as well as qualitative thematic 
analysis. The main unit of analysis was any news or current affairs program item with one of the following 
references: European, Europe, EU, Europa, or Euro. The number of stories making references to the 
United States was also counted. All stories were coded using a detailed coding frame (available upon 
request). All sentences containing the respective references were thematically analyzed; that is, “the data 
are read for analytical themes, which are listed” (Fielding, 2001, p. 159) in two stages: initial coding and 
focused coding. Three main topics will be presented:  
 
1.  Salience of Europe, the EU and the United States on the media agenda, that is, 
frequency of occurrence of European and U.S. stories in comparison with all other topics 
on the agenda.  
2.  Topics, actors, and symbols that dominate the European stories. 
3.  Deixis: frequency of use of deictic European or U.S. references, such as first person 
plural pronouns and adjectives (we, our, us, ours).  
 
The quantitative questions were analyzed in PASW Statistics 17 using the relevant statistical 
procedures. The principal investigator coded all media clips, and 10% of the sample was re-coded by a 
second, independent coder. Inter-rater reliability was tested using Krippendorff’s alpha, which at .8012 
was within the acceptable limits.  
 
Audience Study 
 
 Participants and Procedures. The 174 children interviewed were recruited through schools, as this 
is the most ethically acceptable procedure. The participating pupils were from six schools in England and 
ten in Bulgaria, and both pupils and their parents signed consent forms. All children and parents had the 
option to withdraw at any point, but no one did. The interviews took place between February 2009 and 
February 2010. Theoretical sampling guided the recruitment. The goal was to achieve a degree of 
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randomness in drawing the sub-populations. Once a school was approached, all children in the respective 
age group were asked to participate. The head teachers of schools whose catchment areas featured 
different socioeconomic characteristics (as determined by their Ofsted reports in England) were 
approached to ensure a fair representation of socioeconomic groups. Two towns of fairly similar size and 
distance from their respective capital cities were included. In Bulgaria, the headteachers of all four schools 
approached agreed to participate, while in England six out of twelve schools approached took part. Once 
the initial consent forms were returned and interviews conducted, the further choice of schools was based 
on the same principle, namely, inclusion of as many diverse backgrounds as possible.  
 
 Measures. The interviews consisted of questions in three areas: demography, media use and 
European awareness, and knowledge and identities. The answers presented here are the children’s replies 
to these questions: 
 
1.  Salience of Europe and the EU: “Have you heard of Europe? Have you heard of the 
European Union?” Children were shown photographs of people and symbols such as their 
country’s representative to the European Commission, the European Commission 
President, the EU flag, and the euro coin and were asked: “Do you recognize this 
person?” or “Have you seen this?”  If the answer was yes, then they were subsequently 
asked: “Who is that person?” or “What is this?” 
 
2.  European identities: “Are you European?” Also, in a card question the children were 
shown different identity labels (“child,” “boy,” “girl,” “Bulgarian,” “English,” “European,” 
etc.) and asked to choose the words that “best describe them.” 
 
 The children were asked many questions on these topics, including a range of open-ended ones, 
but the questions presented in this article are representative of the general trends.  
 
Secondary Data Analysis 
 
General trends will be established with a presentation of Eurobarometer data on European 
identity proliferation. The article will discuss the results of a question commonly used as a measure of 
European identity: “In the near future, do you see yourself as . . . : 1. Nationality only, 2. Nationality and 
European, 3. European and Nationality, 4. European only” (European Commission, 2010).  
 
Banal Europeanism in Media Coverage? 
 
 The audience study shows that TV is a key source of information on Europe (for 45.8% of 
Bulgarian children and 50.7% of English children) and on the EU (54.2% and 22.4%, respectively). 
Whereas TV was the main source of information on Europe and the EU for Bulgarian children, more English 
children reported hearing about Europe at school (56.7%) or from parents (50.7%, the same share as 
heard from TV). The quantitative analysis of the frequency of European stories aired on TV reveals a 
substantial national difference: There are roughly two and a half times more Europe/EU stories on 
Bulgarian than on British TV. Thus, only 14 stories out of a total of 202 items contained European 
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references in the UK, as opposed to 67 out of 355 in Bulgaria. Moreover, in another 27 Bulgarian stories 
the EU flag appeared in the video footage without any textual reference to the EU or Europe. By 
comparison, there were nearly twice as many U.S. stories as European stories on British TV (Table 1). 
Even more interestingly, the lowest number of European references and the highest number of U.S. 
stories appeared in the news program British children watched the most, BBC’s Newsround. In Bulgaria an 
opposite trend is evident: The number of European stories is more than three times higher than the 
number of U.S. stories. 
 
Table 1.  Share of European and U.S. Stories on Bulgarian and British TV (N = 174). 
 
Country  TV Stories With: 
Reference to “Europe,” 
“European Union” or 
“European” 
Reference to “U.S.” or 
“United States” 
EU flag 
n % n % N % 
Bulgaria 67 18.9 20 5.6 45 12.7 
United Kingdom 14 6.9 25 12.4 1 0.5 
Note: The stories totaled 355 in Bulgaria and 202 in the UK. 
 
 
A second clear trend is the prevalence of domestic as opposed to European actors and symbols—
more so in the UK. Thus, in Bulgaria domestic actors dominated in 58% of the European stories and in 
England in all but one story of either kind studied. In Bulgaria, although only two EU representatives 
appeared in more than one story, the European Commission was present in nearly a quarter of the stories 
and the European Parliament in 12%. The EU flag appeared in a quarter of the stories. This is hardly 
surprising, given that the EU flag and the Bulgarian flag are usually displayed behind the backs of official 
figures holding press conferences. By contrast, the U.S. President Barack Obama clearly dominated most 
U.S. stories in both countries. 
 
Finally, there were no examples of deixis—first-person plural pronouns and adjectives—in either 
the European or the U.S. stories. “We” and “us” always refer to national identity. Nonetheless, there were 
two notable qualitative differences. First, whenever the national was described in relation to the European 
in the UK, the relationship was portrayed as one between equal partners, whereas in Bulgaria the nation 
was depicted as isubordinate to Europe and the EU member states. Given the overall low number of 
references in the UK (14), any conclusions should be drawn with caution, but the following two examples 
provide an interesting indication of this phenomenon. In one instance the reporter talked about a cancer 
drug that would be available in the UK “as well as the rest of Europe,” while in another example, ringtone 
website payments were presented as a “big problem in this country and around Europe.” The journalists 
did not refer explicitly to the UK as part of Europe, but they implied it is such, without indicating any 
attribution of superiority.  
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In Bulgaria, on the other hand, two thirds of the stories depicted Europe as something Bulgaria 
looked up to—an excellent example to be followed while pursuing goals not yet accomplished. Often the 
main topic was entirely unrelated to Europe, but the reporters inserted a sentence or two to justify 
decisions through reference to the European example. Thus, one of the news items was about the health 
reform in Bulgaria, which has led to a reduced number of hospitals. “The European example shows that 
there are too many hospitals in our country, which is why there should remain less, but better equipped,” 
a reporter concludes without backing up her remark with facts. The “we” here is the national “we” as 
opposed to the “European example,” which by implication comes from outside Bulgaria’s borders. Other 
stories clearly recognize that Bulgaria is part of Europe, but always with negative connotations, for 
example by describing Bulgaria as the country with the “fastest aging population in Europe” or “first in 
Europe in number of heart and brain diseases” or “most corrupt.” Comparison between Bulgaria and 
Europe is always to Bulgaria’s detriment. Europe is depicted as an out-group whose example the new EU 
member should follow to truly become European.  
 
A second notable qualitative difference concerns the focus of coverage. A majority of European-
related stories in Bulgaria had a clear EU focus, either with explicit mention of the EU (52.9%) or through 
implicit reference to practices in European countries. Precisely the latter kind of stories displayed a 
juxtaposition between the national “us” and the European “them.” In the UK, meanwhile, roughly half of 
the stories included a reference to Europe and only three were about the EU.  
 
All in all, the analysis of the media coverage shows that the European topic is considerably more 
salient on the Bulgarian media agenda than on the British one. There were roughly two and half times 
more European stories in Bulgaria, representing nearly a fifth of all news stories. The number of European 
stories on British TV was considerably lower; in fact, Bulgarian TV had three times more European than 
U.S. stories, whereas there were two U.S. stories for every European story on British TV. Moreover, 
European symbols such as the EU flag and key European institutions were often present in the coverage in 
Bulgaria, but European symbols and people were virtually invisible on British TV. By comparison, the U.S. 
president dominated all U.S.-related stories. These trends point to banal flaggings of Europeanism on 
Bulgarian TV and potentially of Americanism on British TV. The use of flags—both national and European—
even in stories that did not refer to Europe or the EU is a perfect example of Billig’s (1995) banal 
nationalism and potentially of Cram’s (2001, 2009) banal Europeanism. The flags are always there, but 
hardly anyone notices them. However, though banal Europeanism in Bulgaria and possibly Americanism in 
the UK appear to operate on the level of symbols, the case is otherwise when looking for deixis. There was 
no identification with the European or the American collective identity through words such as we, us, our, 
or ours. Whenever such words were used, they referred to the national identity.  
 
Nonetheless, one notable national difference was that the qualitative references to Europe in 
Bulgaria imply an inferior position for Bulgaria and often an out-group description of Europe. By contrast, 
the rare instances of references to Europe in the UK described the UK as a full-fledged part of Europe 
and/or an equal partner. Part of the explanation might be that the Bulgarian coverage focused on the EU 
as a supranational organization. Bulgaria only recently joined the EU after years of attempting to fulfill the 
necessary conditions for membership as set by the EU, so it is unsurprising that the media coverage still 
reflects this pre-accession power relationship. And as expected, there was no deixis in the U.S. coverage 
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in either country. Overall, even though Bulgarian TV aired a significant percentage of European stories and 
constant images of European symbols through which Europe is daily “flagged in the eyes of its citizenry” 
(Billig, 1995, p. 6), the lack of deixis and the description of Europe as an out-group suggest that these are 
trends of banal Europeanism in the making rather than the banal Europeanism Cram (2001, 2009) 
describes.  
 
Banal European Identities? 
 
 Do the banal flaggings of European symbols on Bulgarian TV and the invisibility of Europe and 
more substantial presence of U.S. symbols on British TV transfer into banal collective identities?  
 
The level of awareness of Europe and/or the EU and the recognition of key symbols seem to 
reflect the trends in the media coverage. Bulgarian children saw the EU was a considerably more salient 
actor than did English children (Figure 1). Nearly all English children and three fourths of Bulgarian 
children had heard of Europe, χ2(1, N = 174) = 18.02, p < 0.00, but 30% more Bulgarian than English 
children had heard of the EU. Similarly, more Bulgarian than English children recognized important 
European symbols such as the EU flag—84% versus 49%, χ2(1, N = 174) = 24.16, p < 0.001. Bulgarians 
were also more familiar with their European commissioners and their members of the European 
Parliament. In England, only 5% recognized the name of their commissioner, Catherine Ashton, while in 
Bulgaria, 43.9% said they had heard about their then European Commissioner Meglena Kuneva, χ2(1, N = 
174) = 30.85, p < 0.001. Similarly, more Bulgarians recognized their members of the European 
Parliament, and only 13% of English children as opposed to 33% of Bulgarian youngsters correctly 
described the euro as Europe’s currency, χ2(1, N = 174) = 6.82, p = 0.009.  
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Figure 1. Children’s European Awareness and Identities in Bulgaria and England (N = 174). 
 
 
 
Most did not recognize European personalities past or present, such as the European Commission 
president, key member states’ leaders, or historical figures. Among more than 30 national and 
international key figures shown in the UK, the most recognizable face was that of U.S. President Barack 
Obama (Table 3). A total of 86.6% of the English children recognized Obama, followed by 82% who 
recognized Queen Elizabeth II and 77.6% who recognized then Prime Minister Gordon Brown. In Bulgaria, 
on the other hand, the three most recognizable faces belonged to national figures: Prime Minister Boyko 
Borisov (92.5%), the national revolutionary Vasil Levski (83.2%), and the mayor of the town where the 
children lived (76.6%). The U.S. president came in sixth with 55.1%—considerably lower than in the UK, 
which again suggests the banality of U.S. nationalism in the UK. Similarly, the U.S. flag was recognized by 
more UK children than the EU flag: As many as 86.6% had seen it, as opposed to 49% who recognized 
the EU flag. The opposite trend was evident in Bulgaria, where 84% recognized the EU flag and 46.7% the 
U.S. flag. In both countries the national flags were most recognizable of all.   
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Table 2.  Children’s Recognition of Key Symbols and People in Bulgaria and England (N = 174). 
Recognition of symbol or person Bulgaria England 
n % n % 
EU flag 90 84.1 33 49.3 
U.S. flag 50 46.7 58 86.6 
Country’s European commissioner 47 43.9 4 6 
European Commission president 5 4.7 0 0 
U.S. president 59 55.1 58 86.6 
National prime minister 99 92.5 52 77.6 
 
 
Nonetheless, the trends of potential banal Europeanism in Bulgaria and banal Americanism in the 
UK evident in the recognition of symbols were not replicated at the level of identities. European identity 
was not particularly salient for children in either country but was slightly more salient among English 
children, who in general were not as exposed to or as aware of the key European symbols as Bulgarian 
children were. Only 20.6% of Bulgarian children chose the word European to describe themselves, in 
contrast to 28.4% of English children, χ2(1, N = 174) = 6.25, p = 0.001. Similarly, while only 37.4% of 
Bulgarian children replied yes when asked “Are you European?” the proportion among English children was 
52.2%, χ2(1, N = 174) = 3.71, p = 0.05. This finding is interesting because it suggests that the majority 
of children in Bulgaria have not internalized European identity despite their constant exposure to European 
symbols and subsequent recognition of them. Children were not asked identity questions related to 
Americanism because the interviews were conducted in the same period in which the media texts were 
recorded, whereas the finding about the banal flagging of Americanism came to light only subsequently. 
However, it is safe to assume that, if asked whether they are American, the majority of children would 
reply negatively. 
 
 
Eurobarometer Trends 
 
 The Eurobaromater data suggest that the majority of the two countries’ adult populations likewise 
do not endorse European identity. Overall, 43% in Bulgaria and 28% in the UK defined themselves as 
European. Different factors potentially influenced adults, in that more Bulgarian than UK adults reported 
feeling European whereas the opposite trend was evident among children. Detailed explanations are 
explored elsewhere (Slavtcheva-Petkova & Mihelj, 2013) but a possible reason is that Bulgarian children 
find it more difficult to endorse the kind of ideal identity offered by the media (and other socialization 
agents) of a Europe they are constantly trying to catch up with but still lag behind, whereas parents have 
had the opportunity to engage more fully with the whole process of Europeanization and to endorse it 
more wholeheartedly. When Bulgaria joined the EU, the children in the sample were only 6 and 7 years 
old.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The comparison and contrast between the banal flaggings of symbols in the media and the 
collective identities of 9- and 10-year-old children as media audiences, as well as the general trends 
observed in representative surveys among adults, suggest that although there are trends of banal 
Europeanism on the level of symbols and their recognition in Bulgaria and of banal Americanism in the UK, 
this is certainly not the kind of banal nationalism Billig (1995) describes in his seminal work. A number of 
key differences were noted. First, in Billig’s (1995) Day Survey banal nationalism seemed to be manifested 
at the level of both symbol (flags displayed on buildings) and deixis (constant reference to a common 
collective national “us”), but in Bulgaria banal Europeanism operates only on the symbolic level. European 
stories featuring EU symbols such as the EU flag and European institutions constituted a substantial 
proportion of the coverage on Bulgarian TV, in contrast to the UK, where there were fewer European 
stories. Accordingly, Bulgarian children were considerably more aware of the EU and its symbols than 
English children were. But although an EU flag might be flown or other EU symbols might be constantly 
present in people’s lives, as Cram (2009) claims, there is little reference to a common collective European 
“we.” A national “us” seems differentiated from a European “them” in both Bulgaria and England. These 
findings partially confirm some aspects of Billig’s central argument—namely, the importance of symbols 
and the occasional use of deictic pronouns in reference to a national “we.” But neither country provided 
many instances of identification with Europe in the news. In most stories in Bulgaria, Europe is presented 
as the EU: a distant entity whose rules Bulgarians need to follow to become fully European. 
Unsurprisingly, the majority of Bulgarian children reject this wishful identity. Yet interestingly, more than 
half of English children endorse European identity, despite the invisibility of Europe on British TV. In this 
regard, the additional analysis suggests the heavy influence of other factors: socialization agents such as 
school and parents, travel opportunities, and socioeconomic status. This article’s main theoretical 
contribution is to demonstrate that the media/identity relationship is neither causal (Madianou, 2005) nor 
secure but depends on a range of contextual factors, and TV is only one identity resource among others. 
This article thus supports Skey’s (2009) claim that national audiences are not uniform and age seems to 
be an important factor, because Bulgarian children and adults felt different degrees of attachment to the 
EU. The study contributes meaningfully to the field of nationalism studies and the role of the mass media 
by showing how children are active participants in these processes. But whereas Bulgarian children were 
exposed to more banal manifestations of Europe and recognized European symbols more often than their 
British peers, who in turn were more exposed to key American “icons” and found them more recognizable, 
the study did not discover any significant link between the salience of these media representations and 
children’s identities.  
 
Furthermore, the study challenges Cram’s (2001, 2009) expectation that banal Europeanism 
would work more or less in the same way as banal nationalism. The banality of Europeanism is apparent 
only on the symbolic level, not on the level of deixis. Even more problematic is the exploration of banal 
Americanism in the making, which in the UK is apparent in terms of symbols and recognition of key 
symbols and people, such as the U.S. flag and the U.S. president, but conspicuously lacking on the level of 
identification through deixis and potentially by people. Straubhaar’s (1991) “cultural relevance or 
proximity” (p. 39) notion seems to provide a reasonable explanation of some of the trends observed, but 
it is far from helping to unpack the full picture, especially considering additional political factors such as 
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the UK’s “special relationship” with the United States, which potentially contributes to America’s greater 
salience on the media and public agenda there. The media appear to play a role in promoting this “special 
relationship” from a very early age. However, banal Americanism is not as universally widespread as Billig 
assumes, and the role of the media differs across national contexts. Further work is needed to elaborate 
the concept of banal Americanism by conducting a separate audience study coupled with a contextual 
analysis. 
 
In sum, this study’s findings might surprise explorers of banal nationalism and its derivatives, 
because although they affirm some basic tenets of Billig’s argument, especially the importance of symbols 
on both a national and a supranational level and of deixis in terms of reference to a national “we” 
(whatever that “we” is, in the UK context), they also challenge Billig’s (1995) core assumption about a 
default link between banal representations and identities. In explorations of the potential for both banal 
Europeanism in European countries and banal Americanism in non-U.S. contexts, this link seems to be 
missing. It may be that this link is much more straightforward when exploring banal nationalism within 
national borders, and that Billig (1995), when formulating his notion, did not extend his scope to 
supranational banal identities or national identities operating outside national borders. Nonetheless, 
because even his original work lacked an audience study, it took the strength and omnipresence of 
national identities for granted rather than exploring them. Therefore, this link is worth exploring in future 
studies, even those on banal nationalism. 
 
Finally, this study has a number of limitations. First, the audience study is not representative, 
and although it reveals interesting trends, further work is needed to establish whether these trends are 
generalizable. A larger, representative quantitative study in several European countries could work toward 
this end. Moreover, the audience study was conducted in only one of UK’s the four nations and is not, 
therefore, indicative of the views of children from the other three nations, where the interplay between 
the national and the European dimensions is likely to be different. Second, the media content analysis is 
entirely based on a sample representative of the specific group studied at a particular period of time 
rather than of the overall population. Third, the Eurobarometer data are used as a general indicator rather 
than a proper measure of levels of European identifications, precluding firm conclusions about the 
proliferation of European identity. Further, the way the Eurobarometer surveys measure European identity 
is problematic because of the inherent antagonism between the European and national identities in the 
question. Investigation of the relationship between children’s national and European identities, however, 
showed that such an antagonism rarely exists (Slavtcheva-Petkova & Mihelj, 2013). Similarly, the 
quantitative measures of European identity in this study, though fairly limited, are nonetheless 
representative of the qualitative findings that became apparent during the interviews. Finally, the study 
was conducted at the beginning of the most recent economic crisis and worldwide recession, which 
adversely affected some eurozone countries. This crisis has arguably led to more European media 
coverage, and it will be interesting to see whether and how the increased coverage affects the process of 
European identity formation. 
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